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Procedural Choices
in Regulatory Science
Sheila Jasanoff*
Introduction
Over the past twenty years, federal regulatory agencies have
emerged as a critically important locus for scientific fact-finding and
adjudicating controversies about science. In implementing programs of
health, safety and environmental regulation, agency experts must review
and assess the state of scientific knowledge, identify areas of consensus
to the best of their ability, and resolve uncertain evidence consistently
with applicable statutory mandates. These exercises are as public as they
are contentious, and agencies are frequently charged either with
technical incompetence (using "bad science") or with subordinating
science to political ends. 1
Both problems, it is widely felt, can be controlled through greater
reliance on the independent scientific community. Conventional wisdom
holds that increased participation by non-governmental scientists in the
regulatory process will improve not only the quality, but also the
objectivity of policy-relevant science. Accordingly, proposals to
strengthen the role of scientific advisory committees - for example,
through legally mandated peer review - have received considerable
attention in discussions of regulatory reform. 2 The idea that scientific
Professor Jasanoff received an A.B. (Mathematics) from Harvard College, a
Ph.D. (Linguistics) from Harvard University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.
She is Professor of Science Policy and Law and the founding chair of the Department
of Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University.
1 See, e.g., Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk Estimation and Expert Judgment:
The Case of Yucca Mountain, 3 RISK 293, 314 (1992).
*

2 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983); AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY AND
THE CONSERvATION FOUNDATION, ISSUES IN PEER REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS
FOR REGULATORY DECISIONS (1985); Thomas S. Burack, Of Reliable Science:
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issues should be left to scientists continually resurfaces in the regulatory
arena, most notably in the oft-repeated injunction that risk assessment
should be kept strictly separate from risk management. 3 Some,
indeed, have argued that a science court or similar adjudicatory
procedure would be the most appropriate procedural forum for resolving
the technical uncertainties that arise in the course of regulation.4
My aim in this paper is to compare four established approaches to
incorporating science into regulatory decisionmaking, one of which is
very similar to the classic science court proposal. I will argue generally
that adversarial procedures like the science court are less effective in
achieving regulatory objectives than procedures that are more sensitive
to the distinctive characteristics of regulatory science. The paper consists
of three parts, raising analytic, descriptive and normative issues,
respectively. In the first part, I characterize regulatory science using
concepts derived from social studies of science, including recent work
on scientific advice and peer review. In the second part, I review four
brief regulatory histories in order to illustrate the institutional and
procedural mechanisms that agencies most commonly use in processing
scientific information. In the final section, I compare these competing
approaches and evaluate the more court-like proceedings in relation to
less adversarial procedures for assessing regulatory science.
The Characteristics of Regulatory Science
To understand why some approaches to evaluating science work
better than others in the regulatory setting, it is essential to begin with an
inquiry into science itself. What, specifically, can we glean about the
science that is used for regulatory purposes (hereafter "regulatory
science") from currently accepted accounts of the nature of scientific
Scientific Peer Review, FederalRegulatory Agencies, and the Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT.
REsouRcEs L. 27 (1987).
3 See, e.g., Helena Szejwald Brown & Robert L. Goble, The Role of Scientists
in Risk Assessment, 1RISK 283 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated
Advances in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment:An Interim
Report, reprinted infra at 179. See also, Alvin Weinberg, Science and TransScience, 10 MINVA 209 (1972) (suggesting that procedures borrowed from the law
are best suited to resolving trans-scientific questions).
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claims and of the sources of conflict, consensus and authority in

science.
An important insight emerging from the social studies of science in
recent years is that scientific claims are to a large extent "socially
constructed." 5 This argument holds, in brief, that claims in science do
not simply mirror nature but are subject to numerous social influences.
These include, most obviously, the theoretical and methodological
constraints imposed by prevailing scientific paradigms in a given
discipline or historical period. More controversially, however, scientific
claims also seem to incorporate factors unrelated to the presumed
cognitive concerns of science, such as the institutional and political
interests of scientists and their organizations. Evidence for the social
construction of scientific claims derives from several sources, including
the study of scientific controversies, ethnographic studies of laboratories
and historical investigations of the rise and fall of scientific theories. 6
Unlike proponents of "political capture," who attribute scientific
disputes to intentional manipulation of facts by political interests,
advocates of social construction do not insist that ideological differences
among experts are the sole determinant of variations in the interpretation
of data. Evidence from social studies of science suggests, instead, that
expert disputes can arise out of "honest" differences linked to
disciplinary training, institutional affiliation, or professional status. For
example, molecular biologists, toxicologists and epidemiologists may
differ in their definitions of what constitutes an adequately controlled
experiment. And a scientist committed to maintaining disciplinary rigor
may publicly insist that only the use of contemporary controls represents
legitimate science, even though practices within the profession show
wide variation, with many practitioners using a mix of both historical
and contemporaneous controls.
See, e.g., SCIENCE OBSER ED (Karin D. Knorr-Cetina & Michael Mulkay eds.
1983). On the social construction of risk, see THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

5

CONSTRUCION OF RISK (Branden Johnson & Vincent Covello eds. 1987).
6 Major works in these areas include CONTROvERSY (Dorothy Nelkin ed., 2d ed.
1984); BRUNO LArOUR & STEvE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIF (1986); THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE SiRUCTURE OF SCIETIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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These findings have important implications for science in the policy
process, for they lead us to question popularly held beliefs about the
definition of "good science." The traditional view of science holds that
truths revealed by nature are available for skilled scientists to discover
and add to the body of received knowledge through repeated, careful
experimentation. Science, under this reading, is "good" or "bad"
according to the fidelity with which it represents what is actually
happening in nature. Scientists (and only scientists) are believed capable
of policing the boundary between good and bad science; the instrument
they use for this purpose is the scientific method, which centers on
testing and replication, and which - when properly deployed - is
thought to be a virtually foolproof device for weeding out error. Only
replicated results, according to standard doctrine, are worthy of
acceptance within the established canons of science.
From the social constructivist vantage point, however, the creation
of scientific knowledge is much less objective and methodologically
watertight. "Truth" emerges not because nature, when interrogated by
the scientific method, unambiguously reveals the answers, but because
discipline-based scientists agree, through complex processes of
negotiation and compromise, how they should choose among different
possible readings of observations and experiments. Determinations
concerning the goodness or badness of alternative scientific methods,
theories and claims are similarly subject to negotiation among groups of
experts.
The constructivist argument further holds that science, under
appropriate circumstances, can be "deconstructed," that is, broken down
into the conflicting subjective assumptions and interpretations from
which the claims in question were initially formulated. When such
disintegration occurs, consensus vanishes, to be replaced by conflicting
accounts of what the evidence means and how persuasive it is. In the
process of deconstruction, scientists freely attack each other's claims on
personal and subjective grounds ("I simply don't trust his/her results"),
as well as on grounds related to their opponent's theories and
experimental methods ("I don't consider that approach to be
scientifically valid").
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Table 1
Regulatory Science

Research Science

Goals

"Truths" relevant to policy

'Truths" of originality
and significance

Institutions

Government
Industry

Universities

Products

Studies and data analyses,
often unpublished

Published papers

Incentives

Compliance with legal
requirements

Professional recognition
and advancement

Time-frame

Statutory timetables
Political pressure

Open-ended

Options

Acceptance of evidence
Rejection of evidence
Waiting for more data

Acceptance of evidence
Rejection of evidence

Institutions

Congress
Courts
Media

Professional peers

Procedures

Audits and site visits
Regulatory peer review
Judicial review
Legislative oversight

Peer review, formal
and informal

Standards

Absence of fraud or
misrepresentation
Conformity to approved
protocols and agency
guidelines
Legal tests of sufficiency
(e.g., substantial evidence,
preponderance of evidence)

Absence of fraud or
misrepresentation
Conformity to methods
accepted by peer scientists
Statistical significance

Accountability

One does not have to believe rigidly in the constructivist account of
science or adopt the most radical form of ontological skepticism to

conclude that regulatory science is particularly susceptible to divergent,
socially conditioned interpretations. Academic research science, as

practiced in university laboratories, tends to be conducted in
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environments of reasonably strong consensus, governed by established
paradigms and relatively uncontested methodological and quality control
standards. In regulatory science, by contrast,7 standards for assessing
quality tend to be more fluid, controversial and sensitive to political
factors. Important studies often straddle disciplinary boundaries, so that
clearcut assessment standards are hard to identify. Further, regulatory
science is often constrained by strict time limitations that impede
scientific consensus-building. At the same time, the stakes are so much
higher in regulatory than in research science that different interests
groups have incentives to press for divergent, politically congenial
interpretations of the available facts. Table I summarizes these contrasts.
In scientific arenas with uncertain facts, underdeveloped theoretical
paradigms, inconsistent and contested study methods, and politically
salient outcomes, it is hardly surprising that experts' readings of the data
will incorporate subjective biases, such as varying degrees of risk
aversiveness or willingness to tolerate Type I versus Type II statistical
errors. Many detailed studies of expert opinion in the area of carcinogen
risk assessment confirm that scientific and policy judgments intermingle
when scientists are confronted with issues labeled as "trans-science,"
"science policy" or "at the frontiers of scientific knowledge." 8
These properties of regulatory science help explain why
controversies about scientific issues arise so frequently and are pursued
so stubbornly in the regulatory process. 9 On the one hand, our
regulatory laws mandate a culture where regulators and interest groups
alike seek to resolve their differences through appeals to objective
knowledge. On the other hand, decisions are often based on adversarial
proceedings that highlight the scientific differences among participants
and impede negotiation and consensus-formation. Decision makers
compelled to choose between conflicting but well-articulated scientific
claims therefore run the risk of appearing biased or inconsistent. This
7 It should be understood, of course, that the terms "regulatory science" and
"research science" as used here are ideal types; in reality, science can seldom be neatly
boxed into either category.
8 See, e.g., MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER PoucY (1986).
9

SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND PoLMCA.L CULTURE (1986).
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point, noted as early as 1977 in a National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) 10 study of EPA decisionmaking, has since been confirmed in
numerous case studies of regulatory proceedings.
Four Structures of Scientific Assessment
Practices and traditions for building a scientific record differ from
agency to agency in the federal government. In regulatory programs
where consultation with outside experts is legally mandated, for
example, the governing statute may specify which decisions should be
subjected to external review and at what stage in the decisionmaking
process. More generally, the consideration of technical evidence is
governed by congressionally imposed procedural restrictions, which in
most cases are substantially more elaborate than the basic notice and
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Although no two agencies structure their processes for scientific
review exactly alike, some of the crucial differences among agencies can
be captured in the following two-by-two matrix.
"Legislative"
"Adjudicatory"
Assessor
Process
Process
Scientists Assess
Risk Information
Agency Assesses
Risk Information

1

2

3

4

One dimension indicates which of two decision makers - the
agency staff or outside experts - does the initial risk assessment. The
second refers to procedural form - legislative (informal) or trial-type
(formal) - used to definitively interpret the evidence. Proceedings
belonging in boxes 1 and 2 are perhaps best illustrated by FDA's
-programs for reviewing drugs and food additives. The agency initially
grants wide powers to its outside experts. They may be asked to
evaluate the strength and quality of the scientific literature pertaining to
risk, as well as to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of risk,
10 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 2 DEcisioN MAKING IN
PROTECON AGENCY 48 (1977).

E ENvIRONMENTAL
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whether the risk is significant, and, occasionally, how the agency
should act to control the risk. For proceedings in boxes 3 and 4, by
contrast, the initial data evaluation and risk assessment are carried out by
the agency's in-house staff and are presented for validation to an
external scientific committee, functionally analogous to a panel of expert
judges. Examples include EPA's review processes for ambient air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act and for pesticide decisions
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
Proceedings in boxes 2 and 4 are most court-like in form, with box 4
corresponding most closely to the science court model.
The theory of social constructivism implies that processes fostering
negotiation rather than confrontation (hence, those in boxes 1 and 3) are
most likely to lead to acceptable consensus positions on scientific
issues. According to this view, parties who participate in negotiating
competing claims will sooner converge toward a shared cognitive
position than those who remain outside the negotiation process.
Common readings of contested evidence are less likely to develop in
adversarial settings, particularly when scientific debate is polarized
along political lines, so that participants have economic or ideological
stakes in deconstructing each other's claims. These predictions appear to
find support in empirical research, as illustrated below.
Sulfites
A review of the health risks of sulfiting agents (compounds used in
food preparation to prevent discoloration) sponsored by FDA illustrates
how both regulatory science and regulatory policy issues were
satisfactorily resolved in a proceeding that combined risk assessment by
an expert panel with informal procedures for soliciting public input.
Review was triggered in this case by reports in the medical literature of
acute allergic responses to sulfites in food, including a number of
fatalities. FDA contracted with the Federation of American Societies for
Experimental Biology (FASEB) to analyze the medical reports and
determine how sulfites should be classified in terms of risk to public
health. To carry out these tasks, FASEB appointed an ad hoc panel of
experts, almost all of whom had previously advised FDA on the issue of
sulfite sensitivity.
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The expert panel concluded its initial review of the literature with a
draft report stating that there was cause for concern about sensitive
individuals (e.g., asthmatics) exposed to sulfites and that these concerns
could best be addressed by means of warning labels in restaurants and
markets offering sulfite-treated foods. The panel then held a public
meeting at which evidence was taken from a variety of sources:
consumer groups, representatives of the food industry and scientists
working on sulfite reactions. The testimony presented at this meeting led
the panel to reaffirm its conclusion that sulfites were safe at allowed
doses for the general population, but that they presented a risk of
"unpredictable severity" for specially sensitive individuals. However,
the panel reversed itself on the issue of warning labels and advised FDA
that labeling alone would not adequately protect sulfite sensitive persons
in all exposure contexts. Sulfite use, the panel recommended, should be
banned for some categories of foodstuffs, most notably fresh produce
on salad bars. FDA went along with this recommendation in its final
regulatory package on sulfites.
In this case, the independent panel's expertise bolstered FDA's
judgment that sulfites posed a health threat deserving of regulatory
attention, even though scientific evidence about the nature and
magnitude of risk was by no means conclusive. At the same time, the
open public meeting held by the panel gave participants of varied
interests and affiliations the chance to comment meaningfully on the
nontechnical aspects of the decisionmaking process. Importantly, the
panel served as a forum for mediating among different viewpoints on
who should be protected and at what cost, rather than as a technical
judiciary charged with finding the single scientifically "correct" answer.
The panel's success can be gauged from the fact that FDA's subsequent
imposition of a partial ban on sulfites aroused no serious opposition or
criticism.
Aspartame
The Public Board of Inquiry (PBOI) convened by FDA to review
the safety of the artificial sweetener aspartame illustrates how an expert
panel can fall short of offering useful policy advice by too strictly
4 RISK - Issues in Health & Safety 143 [Spring 1993]

insulating scientific fact-finding from the subsequent regulatory
decision. In this case, a panel of three scientist "judges" heard evidence
from numerous scientist "witnesses" holding different views about the
safety of aspartame. All the questioning at the hearing was carried out
by scientists rather than lawyers. Some commentators have described
the proceeding as a kind of "science court," 11 but others have noted
that it was more like a scientific seminar, because there was no advocacy
of particular policy outcomes. 12 Unlike a court decision, moreover, the
PBOI's judgments about the scientific data were only advisory; they
were not regarded as binding by the agency.
Consistent with the empirical literature on such expert inquiries, the
PBOI was fairly successful in pinpointing areas of scientific
disagreement and getting alternative views of the data out into the open.
It was, however, less successful as a mechanism for building an
authoritative scientific rationale to guide policy action. Efforts to
showcase the PBOI as an objective, scientific proceeding proved
controversial, as critics pointed to possible disciplinary and institutional
biases on the panel. Lawyers deplored the ambiguous legal status of the
PBOI's findings, as well as the panel's failure to adhere to such basic
norms of legal decisionmaking as providing citations to the record in its
final decision. Finally, although the PBOI concluded that more testing
was needed to determine whether aspartame caused brain tumors, FDA
overrode the board's scientific opinion and approved the compound for
certain tabletop uses without waiting for additional evidence. The PBOI
apparently did not damage FDA's credibility, but it would be difficult to
conclude that the proceeding substantially improved the agency's
scientific assessment of aspartame. Indeed, it is arguable that
decisionmaking proceeded in relatively untroubled fashion precisely
because FDA felt free to make its policy decision unconstrained by the
PBOI's expert judgment.
11 Vincent Brannigan, The First FDA Public Board of Inquiry: The Aspartame
Case, in LAW AND SCIENCE INCOLLABORATION (J.D. Nyhart & Milton M. Carrow

eds. 1983).

12 Sidney A.Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of HearingProcedures:
Evaluatingthe FDA's PublicBoardof Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288-45.

Jasanoff: Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science 153

Ozone
The ozone case shows how scientific review in one EPA program
became more effective when the agency shifted from an adversarial to a
negotiated approach and, at the same time, stopped insisting on a rigid
separation of science from policy. EPA undertook to review the primary
national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for ozone in the late
1970's. The agency's official advisory panel, a precursor to the current
Science Advisory Board (SAB), found fault with the scientific data and
arguments underlying the proposed standard. EPA thereupon sought to
bypass the SAB committee by seeking advice from a separate, more
sympathetic committee constituted under the leadership of Dr. Carl Shy,
a "pro-health" scientist. To justify this irregular and ad hoc procedure,
EPA argued that certain legally mandated determinations (e.g., the
meaning of "adverse health effect") were matters of policy that could be
decided by the agency without review by the SAB. These attempts to
increase its jurisdiction over decisions at the boundary of science and
policy exposed EPA to a lawsuit, 13 as well as to criticism from both
14
the scientific and policy analytic communities.
In a subsequent review of the ozone standard, EPA adopted a
significantly more conciliatory attitude to its Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee (CASAC). The review process was modified to
allow the committee to interact at least twice with the agency staff: once
over the statutorily required "criteria document" and once over the "staff
paper" containing the rationale for the proposed standard. EPA,
moreover, stopped insisting that the committee's jurisdiction was limited
exclusively to science. In a more conciliatory spirit, the agency
permitted the panel to discuss borderline questions that had previously
been designated as (science) policy. Specifically, CASAC addressed
both the definition of "adverse health effect" and the choice of a risk
assessment methodology.

13 American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
14 For an impressively detailed criticism of EPA's decision making in this case,
see R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURS (1983).
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As one pay-off from this strategy, EPA gained CASAC's support

for some controversial methodological and interpretative decisions,
including the contested approach to risk assessment that had so troubled
the SAB panelists. Of course, the agency had in the interim substantially
refined its risk assessment procedures and was on stronger technical
ground than in the first ozone review. But transcripts of CASAC
meetings suggest that discussing the issues in a non-adversarial
negotiating environment was also an important factor in overcoming the
skepticism of some committee members and in gaining the committee's
eventual backing for the agency's risk assessment strategy.
Daminozide (Alar)
The Alar case, by contrast, supports the view that confrontational
advisory procedures, with outside scientists cast in a judicial role, are
poorly suited to building a workable consensus on regulatory science.
EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) carried out a review and risk
assessment of daminozide (trade named Alar) and its breakdown
product UDMH to determine whether this widely used plant growth
regulator was safe for use. Based on available bioassay results, OPP
concluded that Alar posed a significant risk of human cancer and should
be promptly withdrawn from the market. The agency's Scientific
Advisory Panel (SAP), however, came to quite a different conclusion.
In the SAP's judgment, all of the animal studies relied upon by OPP
were flawed and should not have been used for quantitative risk
assessment. 15 Since these views effectively ruled out immediate action
on Alar, EPA felt its only recourse was to ask Uniroyal, Alar's
manufacturer, to carry out additional studies on the substance's
carcinogenicity. Environmental groups went to court claiming that EPA
should not have relied on the panel and should have regulated Alar on
the evidence already available, but their plea was denied on procedural
grounds.16
15 These proceedings are discussed in greater detail in Sheila Jasanoff, EPA's
Regulation of Daminozide: Unscrambling the Messages of Risk, 12 SCIENCE,
TICHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 116 (1987).
16 Nader v. EPA, 859 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1988).
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When Uniroyal's tests apparently confirmed the earlier scientific
findings of carcinogenicity, EPA encountered much negative publicity
for its handling of the case. A perturbing risk assessment of Alar
produced by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) caught
national attention, even though it was based in part on studies
previously discredited by the SAP. Under growing consumer pressure,
Uniroyal "voluntarily" withdrew the product from the market.
In this case, peer review by the SAP initially prevented EPA from
proceeding on the basis of problematic animal studies. However, the
adversarial flavor of the Alar review fed suspicions among
environmentalists that the SAP members were allied with (or "captured"
by) industry. In a politically polarized environment, NRDC's efforts to
seize the scientific initiative and to project its own assessment of risk
proved highly successful. In the end, the public attached greater weight
to NRDC's seemingly more disinterested expertise than to the alternative
risk assessment prepared by EPA and endorsed by the SAP.
Improving the Fit between Science and Policy
These four regulatory science controversies suggest that the
legitimacy of scientific assessments in a policy setting can be enhanced
through procedures that stress negotiation and compromise, rather than
adversarial conflict, among interested parties. The constructivist
viewpoint implies, in particular, that claims concerning regulatory
science can be made more credible to both lay and expert audiences if
the independent scientific community engages with other interests including government scientists - in a process of mutual
accommodation. When outside scientists are poised adversarially in
relation to the agency, rifts may develop between their respective
interpretation of the data, with damage to the credibility of both sides.
At the same time, a scientific assessment process that is symbolically
insulated from the appearance of politics may play a critically important
role in certifying that evidence conforms to standards judged acceptable
by the scientific community. Controversies over regulatory science often
turn on the issue of when the evidence should be deemed strong enough
4 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 143 [Spring 1993]

to justify regulatory action. Given the uncertainties of the data, it is
almost always possible for skeptics to argue that more research or
"better" science would clarify policy choices. Thus, decisions to
proceed on the basis of available evidence generally involve a trade-off
between more data and quicker action, or, more crudely, science and
safety. This is an area where an independent scientific process can
usefully shore up an agency's judgment.
The scientific controversies of the 1970's arose, in part, because
regulatory agencies failed to acknowledge the need for some role
separation between science and policy. They acted on the basis of
internal scientific analyses - often labeled (science) policy - without
securing support from scientists outside government. The Alar
controversy illustrates the opposite dynamic, with the scientific
assessment in effect swallowing up the policy-maker's independent
role. The result was to taint the advisory committee as too pro-industry,
because it accepted the views of Uniroyal's experts with too little
apparent regard for EPA's contrary analysis.
The foregoing observations lead to several general recommendations
for achieving a better fit between science and policy in regulatory
decision making:
Forum Design. An appropriate choice of institutional forum is an
essential step in facilitating negotiation among the interests (both
scientific and non-scientific) that have a stake in the interpretation of
science. One approach is to create multipartite bodies that are capable,
simultaneously, of negotiating differences over "facts" and values. But
achieving a harmonious political balance on committees that are
perceived as scientific may not always be feasible. The scientific
community, for instance, vigorously rejected a proposal to place on
EPA's Science Advisory Board designated representatives of industry,
environmental groups and other political interests. 17 Proposals to make
expert groups openly political should be approached with caution on
theoretical grounds as well. Particularly in the U.S. regulatory context,
an expert committee's cardinal function is to certify that the science used
17 Nicholas A. Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use in
Regulatory Decisionmaking,9 ScL TEaL &HuM. VALUES 72 (1984).
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in regulatory decisions is legitimate. Its capacity to deliver this message
forcefully may be weakened if its scientific credentials appear to be
compromised by political ties.
An alternative approach, which has been successfully used in
selecting SAB members at EPA, is to ensure informally that experts
appointed to an assessment body span a representative range of
scientific and philosophical positions. This option is consistent with the
constructivist viewpoint, since it acknowledges that scientists are not
value-free. The tradeoff is that it gives the appointing agency
considerable latitude in selecting experts and depends for its success on
the experience and integrity of the agency's administrative staff.
Process Design. It emerges from the foregoing discussion that
advisory committee proceedings should be structured, wherever
possible, as occasions for multilateral exchange, with opportunities for
give-and-take between the experts, the agency and other interested
participants. In rule making as in litigation, adversarial proceedings
polarize and harden differences of opinion, narrow the range of views
presented and hinder negotiation and compromise. These negative
consequences are especially difficult to avoid when scientific advice is
incorporated by law into a fundamentally adjudicatory process, as in the
case of FIFRA proceedings. Agencies other than EPA, however,
generally retain the discretion to structure their interactions with the
scientific community in formats of their own selection. For example,
FDA voluntarily decided to assess aspartame by means of the court-like
Public Board of Inquiry. A proposal in the mid-1970's that agencies
should use scientists rather than lawyers to cross-examine experts was
similarly premised on a belief that science should be separated from
policy and that adversarial procedures were a desirable means of
establishing scientific "truth. ' 18 Again, both theoretical and empirical
explorations of regulatory science suggest that such initiatives are ill
advised.
The timing of scientific assessment by outside experts is another
issue that merits consideration in designing appropriate rulemaking
18 James C. Miller III, Regulation and Experts: A Modest Proposal,Regulation,
Nov.fDec., 1977, at 36.
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processes. In general, the more delayed the onset of consultation, the
greater is the potential for divergences to develop between agencies and
their expert advisers - and, consequently, for disputes to arise over the
"correct" reading of regulatory science. Processes that allow for
repeated consultation between agencies and reviewing bodies (as in the
review of EPA's ozone standard) would guard against such drift and
would be most in keeping with the negotiated model of science. Such
proceedings, however, are expensive and hence may not be costeffective for most regulatory programs.
Where repeated consultation is not feasible, using the scientific
advisory process to arrive at the initial determination of risk (as in
FDA's sulfite and aspartame proceedings) may provide a safety valve
against subsequent controversy. This approach, however, may be
legally foreclosed if it is inconsistent with an agency's statutory
mandates concerning the timing of expert review. Also, as a practical
matter, asking advisory committees to review the scientific literature and
perform a risk assessment may be realistic only when the scientific
issues are fairly limited in scope and do not cut across many disciplinary
boundaries.
JudicialReview. Scientific review, as noted above, can help certify
that inferences drawn by regulatory agencies are within the range of
choices deemed acceptable by the relevant expert community. Another
way of stating this point is to say that review by outside experts helps
confirm that regulatory decisions are substantively rational. In this
respect, scientific review performs a function normally assigned to the
courts in U.S. administrative law. Evidence from empirical studies of
decision making indicate, for instance, that scientific reviewers ask
agencies many of the same questions that courts traditionally have asked
pursuant to the "hard look" doctrine: Is the analysis balanced? Does it
take account of all the relevant data? Do the conclusions follow
rationally from the evidence? Is the analysis clear, coherent and
presented in an understandable manner? 19 By virtue of their specialized
training and experience, scientific reviewers are likely to be more
19 See generally SHEILA

POUCYMAKERs (1990).

JASANOFF,
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effective than judges in evaluating agency responses to such questions.
There is little evidence that courts, for their part, clearly understand
the role and limits of scientific review or have begun to think about the
appropriate relationship between review by expert panels and judicial
review. One reason for this state of affairs is that only a handful of
lawsuits in the area of health, safety and environmental regulation have
specifically focused on the adequacy of agency dealings with expert
committees. When this issue is raised, experience to date suggests that
courts may be more inclined to evade it than to address it. Thus, in API
v. Costle (the ozone case), the D.C. Circuit found it unnecessary to
consider whether EPA's consultation with the Shy Panel violated the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 20 since the agency did not follow the
panel's recommendations in promulgating the final ozone standard. As
to EPA's failure to consult fully with the SAB in the same case, the
court held that this oversight, while serious, was insufficient by itself to
invalidate a standard that otherwise appeared to be adequately supported
by the record. In Nader v. EPA (the Alar case), the plaintiff
environmental groups charged EPA with an "arbitrary and capricious"
decision to follow the SAP's restraining advice, when the agency, in
their view, had a legally sufficient basis for regulating Alar. The Ninth
Circuit, however, ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had
failed to raise these claims in timely fashion before the agency.
Since conscientious scientific review overlaps functionally with
substantive judicial review, courts should be especially reluctant to
intervene in cases where it appears that an expert panel has forced the
agency to take a "hard look" at the scientific record. However, despite
their functional similarities, scientific review and judicial review are not
in the final analysis equivalent processes. No matter what an expert
panel says about an agency's analysis of science, courts have an
independent duty to ensure that regulatory decisions comply with the
law. In the exercise of this prerogative, courts may on occasion mandate
regulatory action even if an expert panel counsels the opposite.2 1 More
20 5 U.S.C. App (1988), Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
21 This is arguably what happened in Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1987). In that case, FDA consulted with a scientific advisory panel to
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typically, however, courts should expect to play an assertive role in
reviewing cases where agencies and advisory committees disagree in
their readings of the scientific record or when there is evidence of
impropriety in soliciting scientific advice.
Conclusion
More than two decades of experience with science-intensive policymaking have established beyond doubt that regulatory agencies need the
independent scientific community to validate their own exercises of
expert judgment. Contrary to some early expectations, however, the
format of the science court has not proved to be especially helpful in
structuring the interactions between governmental and independent
experts. The technical issues that arouse greatest controversy in
regulatory settings lie in a grey zone between science and policy or facts
and values. Typically, there is no single right way to iron out the
multiple ambiguities in the regulatory record; decisions about the
"science" almost invariably are complex constructs, incorporating
elements of science as well as society. Both scientists and policymakers, therefore, must participate in the process of resolving disputes
over regulatory science, and I have suggested that it is important for
symbolic reasons to keep the scientists' role institutionally separate from
that of the policy-maker. Aiming for the kind of rigid cognitive
separation that underlies the science court idea, however, is bound to be
counterproductive, as is the insistence on adversarial modes of factfinding. In regulatory science, as most areas of contested human
activity, solutions are more likely to emerge from negotiation and
compromise than from bipolar, head-to-head conflict.

confirm its view that certain color additives presented a de minimis risk of human
cancer and hence, implicitly, should not be regulated under the Delaney clause of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The court held, in effect, that the panel's
scientific advice was immaterial to the legal outcome, since the statute
unambiguously called for a ban on color additives shown to induce cancer in animals.

